Fortifying Governance: Scalable Consensus & Forfeiture Mechanism revised

Proposals
1

Summary:

To enhance governance, this proposal aims to introduce a scalable consensus mechanism and a forfeiture system to deter non-serious proposals. By penalizing frivolous submissions, we ensure high-quality proposals and meaningful voter participation. These measures will strengthen the governance model and enhance the overall value of the governance token.

Justifications :

As of writing 7-Oct-2024. Total Final Supply of 559,970 Gzils have been minted. Total Holders: 66,926
Top 3 Largest Holder accounts for 2.68%, 1.78%, 1.48% share of total Zils respectively. This makes Gzils widely and evenly distributed across numerous holders.
https://viewblock.io/zilliqa/address/zil14pzuzq6v6pmmmrfjhczywguu0e97djepxt8g3e?tab=holders

In snapshot: ā€œThe proposal to lower the governance quorum to 8%ā€ was created because of a decrease in voter activity
https://governance.zilliqa.com/#/gzil/proposal/QmXCTSFwyXDPb7pPa6VtT43wkLv4uiA6eYJ89uhdotHdyY

The previous proposal above was incomplete due to the following;

  • When voter turnout is exceptionally high, the low consensus requirement turns the process into a race to see who can act the quickest
  • Potential of Abuse: May lead to mass acquiring of Gzils by a single individual/group to ā€œforcefullyā€ push through proposal quickly

This current proposal serves to enhance the spirit and security of the governance by allowing;

Scalability against the activeness of the participants

  • The subsequent quorum will increase by 10% for every successful submission to Snapshot with a ceiling cap of 48.92% against total quorum.

eg. Current approval requirement of 8% of total circulating supply of Gzil will be 8.8% for next snapshot.

  • The subsequent quorum will decrease by 10% for every successful submission to Snapshot with a floor of 8% against total quorum. Eg. If current quorum is at 30.37%, it will reduce to 27.61% for next snapshot. with a floor base of 8%.

Quorum Range based on +/-10%
[8.00% 8.80% 9.68% 10.65% 11.71% 12.88% 14.17% 15.59% 17.15% 18.86% 20.75% 22.82% 25.11% 27.62% 30.38% 33.42% 36.76% 40.44% 44.48% 48.93%]

Further edit: As the proposal is to make governance more inclusive and allow scaling in anticipation of increase in voter turnout, to prevent quorum increases beyond pool of active voters and increasing difficulty, the adjustment of increased in quorum requirements will only apply if current snapshot turnouts > previous snapshot. Else changes will not take effect. Whereas a decrease in quorum requirements will take effect if current snapshot turnout < previous snapshot turn out.
Forfeiture Mechanism

Under ZIP-12, for snapshot to happen, it only requires the person who proposes to hold at least 30 Gzils in their wallet address. As there is no penalty, this would not discourage poor proposals or spams from happening. Therefore, the proposal also introduces a forfeiture mechanism.

  • Increase Gzil requirements for Snapshot. Gzil had a market high of USD 657.90. 30 Gzil = 19.7K USD.
    current price (7-Oct-24), this equates to USD 3.20 or 30 Gzils = 96 USD.
    Propose to pegged Gzil requirements to snapshot to 1K USD Fiat.
  • To prevent spams of proposals, this proposal also suggests to introduce penalties for failure to reach 15% of required quorum for ā€œFORā€ proposal. If proposal is weak, the 1K USD Fiat worth of Gzil will be forfeited and burnt.

Summary:
Overall, the following proposed changes will strength the seriousness of proposals and dilute weak attempts to disorganise or take up unnecessary resources to maintain good governance. This will also bring more value to Gzil holders who are vested in the success of the chain.

  • For: Implement Scalable Consensus & Forfeiture Penalty
  • Against: Current Quorum mechanism is sufficient for now
  • Edit: Suggest Enhancing it. eg. Reduce Penalty , Remove Penalty
0 voters

Thanks Barmazoid for the help in the pool

2
  • When voter turnout is exceptionally high, the low consensus requirement turns the process into a race to see who can act the quickest

I disagree, its not a race because the end result and decision isnt decided when reaching quorum. if a proposal isnt one sided, then you would have the equal amount voting for and against.

Reaching quorum isnt the end of the vote, the end of the vote end date is the end of the voting, of how many gzil on both sides of the decision. the quorum is just a min requirement, it is nothing more than that.

Abstaining from voting should never be a solution to voting against a proposal. the only thing increasing quorum does is exactly that, ppl dont vote against and hope quorum isnt made.

1 Like
3
  • I suggest dividing your ideas into different proposals. Even if people are against one part of the proposal, they might support another. For example, I like the first part, but with some changes.
  • I would recommend starting with a smaller quorum range to ensure it works effectively - 8-20%, for example. Later, we can gradually increase the maximum value if it proves successful. Iā€™m concerned that 50% might be too high. If we set the maximum value too high, we could end up in a situation where the quorum increases to an unrealistic level, making it impossible to reach. This would guarantee that one of the votes will eventually fail. If a vote fails, the next one might succeed, but we will lose time. Then the quorum will rise to an unrealistic level again, causing another failure. This process could repeat endlessly.
  • I donā€™t like the idea of increasing the gZIL requirements for Snapshot. $100 is already sufficient, and it can increase later if the price of ZIL and gZIL grows.
  • I donā€™t support the idea of burning gZIL if people donā€™t vote for a proposal. Sometimes, a proposal might be good, but people just ignore it, and when the voter turnout is low, it can be difficult to reach 15%. This will lead to a situation where people are afraid to submit proposals.
  • I suggest removing mandatory voting on the forum because itā€™s not possible to control whether each user has only one account. However, I would keep the 3-day discussion period.
1 Like
4

Iā€™m fully in favour of improving governance, but while I agree with much of the intent and logic behind this proposal, some of the proposed changes seem overly restrictive, particularly concerning inclusivity and penalisation.

Going through each point:

  1. Pegging $gZIL Requirements to a $1,000 fiat equivalent feels like a steep entry fee for submitting a proposal, especially given the proposed forfeiture mechanism, where this amount could essentially be lost. The current 30 gZIL requirement (around $100) is a more accessible amount for most users.

Raising $gZIL Requirements could work better if combined with a DAO/group mechanism in the governance process, where users could pool $gZIL into a trusted entity that votes on their behalf. This would allow users to back a $1,000 equivalent while letting the DAO/group represent their interests. However, this requires significant trustā€”trust that the DAO will vote in line with usersā€™ wishes and wonā€™t simply hightail with the $1,000.

Perhaps raising the requirement to, say, 100 gZIL would make it harder for malicious or spammy proposals to be submitted without being too punishing on those with good intentions and ideas.

  1. Scaling the Difficulty for Consecutive Proposals. Love the idea here - it adds significance to each vote and places emphasis on making voting meaningful. That said, my concern is that this might dissuade participation. If the quorum required gets too high, it may deter users from proposing anything, fearing it wonā€™t pass.

I also agree with Barmazoidā€™s suggestion to cap the quorum range at 20% initially, to see if it effectively boosts participation and voter engagement in the short term - then adjust if it does.

  1. Forfeiture Mechanism: This is a great idea in theory, but Iā€™m concerned about how it might play out in practice. Thereā€™s a risk that users might maliciously ignore the proposal just to burn the proposerā€™s gZIL. Or, as Barmazoid highlights, voter turnout is low due to poor visibility/engagement.

If the lack of support for a proposal is due to a lack of visibility, perhaps that failed proposal should just return to the drawing board? Does it warrant a penalty? Especially if we raise $gZIL requirements - should that much money go down the drain, putting a full stop to what could genuinely be a well-intentioned proposal that might just needed more time to brew?

Perhaps an answer to a failed proposal is a ā€˜suspensionā€™ mechanism that prevents it from being proposed for x timeframe. But, I fear that that too could be prone to malice.

Overall, Iā€™m in favour of the difficulty scaling, though it should have an initial lower cap of 20%. I also support raising gZIL requirements, just not pegged at $1,000ā€”itā€™s a bit too high, in my opinion. A flat 100 gZIL might be a better alternative. The forfeiture mechanism, while appealing, could be prone to misuse.