The GZIL Collective aims to enhance decentralized governance within the Zilliqa ecosystem. This proposal outlines the roles and responsibilities of the GZIL Committee, which include establishing guidelines, reviewing and providing expert opinions on proposals, ensuring adherence to guidelines, approving and releasing funds for initiatives, and monitoring funded projects.
Roles and Responsibilities of the GZIL Committee
Establish Guidelines: Formulate guidelines for the GZIL Committee.
Review Proposals: Evaluate proposals submitted by the community.
Provide Expert Opinions: Offer expert insights and recommendations.
Ensure Adherence: Ensure proposals posted on the Forum and Snapshot comply with established guidelines.
Fund Allocation: Approve and release funds to projects and initiatives endorsed by GZIL holders.
Progress Monitoring: Track and monitor the progress of projects and initiatives funded by the GZIL collective.
Important Notes
Re-election: The GZIL Committee will be re-elected every six months.
Founding Members: There will be five founding members in the GZIL Committee.
Multi-signature Signers: There will be a total of eight multi-signature signers:
5 GZIL Committee signers
3 signers from the Zilliqa core team
Signer Reduction: By the first anniversary of the GZIL collective, the number of Zilliqa core team signers will be reduced to one.
Proposed GZIL Committee Members
We propose the following individuals to form the GZIL Collective Committee:
Read on to know more about the members we are proposing to form the
Committee:
Will: Will is an OG Zilliqan who has been with Zilliqa since the time of ICO. He is very interested in on-chain governance and always participates in discussions, sharing ideas and suggestions. We feel his expertise will be very handy in shaping up the committee.
Patricia, Xenderz, Choco: These individuals are household names in the Zilliqa community, usually found helping fellow community members on X, Discord, Telegram, and other platforms. They have keen eyes which help keep tabs on everything happening in the ecosystem. They always go above and beyond in helping out ecosystem projects by all means and care deeply about on-chain governance. They will play an important role in monitoring the projects and initiatives that will receive funds from the GZIL Committee.
House of Chimera: Diederick Jacobs, Founder of House of Chimera, has played a key role in amplifying Zilliqa’s vision. Leveraging his extensive network, he aims to attract new projects, forge partnerships, and inspire builders to innovate on the platform.
For : Support the Formation of the GZIL Collective Committee and its initial members
Against : Oppose the Formation of the GZIL Collective Committee
Generally for this proposal and a good start to the GZIL Collective Committee.
Where I think this could be adjusted is that important note 4. should be removed. Instead the collective should look to expand in size (to 25+ people in the longer term) to reduce any concentration of power, so that it includes well known community members, builders and the Zilliqa core team.
And perhaps it should include that the first task of the committee is writing a charter for the GZIL Collective fund that outlines what it’s for.
I understand the Zilliqa core team would like this to be a community-led initiative but agree it makes sense for them to maintain their role as co-signers, even if they aren’t involved in the day-to-day administration of the fund. I expect the fund will operate on the basis that a zil core signature will always be required though, regardless of how many signees they have.
I also agree it’s important to expand and include builders/devs in the team, but recognise the argument around potential conflicts of interest. Hopefully once a framework and code of practice/charter is in place this will mitigate any concerns around this. But in terms of concentration of power, and to echo what Rahul has already said on TG, at no point will the committee have absolute power to dictate what is proposed, passed or failed. This power rests in the hands of GZIL holders. Per the proposal, the GZIL Committee is formulated to lay down a framework, which everyone can collectively help with, and administer the fund according to that framework.
There are arguments around conflicts of interest around every member (community, builder, core etc) of the GZIL Collective Committee, including the members currently proposed. However it looks like we all agree that the committee should be expanded, not shrinked, so I think it’s still important that the initial formation proposal reflects that. Since that’ll affect the initial framework the committee is supposed to form.
As part of that effort it does not make sense the have the Signer Reduction part of this proposal in there, a sizable amount of the core team should be in the committee.
If anything it should be replaced by a point that the committee will be looking to expand in size over the first year. Which lowers everybody’s conflicts and power concentration.
Thank you for your thoughtful feedback on the proposal.
Regarding your suggestion:
Expansion of the Committee: We agree that expanding the GZIL Committee to include more well-known community members and builders is essential for reducing concentration of power. We will incorporate this into our plans for the committee’s development over time.
First Task: We have also taken note of your suggestion to have the committee be writing a charter for the GZIL Collective fund/sign-off. This is a great idea, and we will include it in the initial agenda.
I will revised the proposal to reflect these changes and believe it strengthens our approach to decentralized governance within the Zilliqa ecosystem. Thank you once again for your valuable insights
Expansion: Over time, the GZIL Committee should look to expand in size to include more well-known community members and builders, reducing any concentration of power.
Having a council is a great idea! However, a group of five members feels a bit small. I’d suggest including Zekromo and Zilstream to broaden the perspectives. Re-electing everyone every six months might introduce some instability, as it could disrupt continuity with previously approved plans and future initiatives. Perhaps a more flexible approach, like replacing members only when necessary, could work better.